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tax notes state
States Should Quickly Reform Unemployment Insurance
by Brian Galle, David Gamage, Erin Adele Scharff, and Darien Shanske

Brian Galle is a professor at Georgetown
University Law Center; David Gamage is a
professor at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law; Erin Scharff is an associate professor at
Arizona State University Law School; and Darien
Shanske is a professor at the University of
California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall).
Galle is the principal author of this article and is
thus listed first. The remaining authors are listed
alphabetically.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives on
SALT, the authors discuss COVID-19 and how
state governments should act to reform
unemployment insurance eligibility and benefits
and the taxes funding these programs.

COVID-19 is causing mass layoffs and related
economic hardship, as well as budget crises for
1
state and local governments. This article is part of
Project SAFE (State Action in Fiscal Emergencies),
an academic effort to help states weather the fiscal
crisis by providing policy recommendations
2
backed by research. This article will focus on how
state governments should reform unemployment
insurance (UI) eligibility and benefits and the
taxes funding these programs.
Economic downturns are the wrong time to
worry about fiscal rectitude. Yet, in the past, states
have contributed to national economic misery
during recessions by reducing benefits, cutting
3
public sector jobs, and raising taxes. Prudent
fiscal planning in the form of rainy day funds can
help to avoid this dilemma, but no state’s rainy
day fund is anywhere near large enough to
4
weather the current storm. Borrowing is a painful
alternative, but when savings are not enough, it
must be embraced. That is especially so now,
when we face not an ordinary recession but one in
which the capacity of state and local governments
to respond to the urgent physical needs of their
citizens is in high demand. States must quickly
seek additional funds from sources that will not
exacerbate economic misery for state residents.
Federal aid is especially to be sought because — in
contrast to state governments — the federal

1

Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.
2

Id.

3

David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749, 754-68 (2010).
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Grant A. Driessen, “State and Local Fiscal Conditions and Economic
Shocks,” Congressional Research Service (Mar. 20, 2020) (stating that
although there was projected to be roughly $62 billion in state rainy day
funds at the end of 2019, “use of rainy day funds alone would likely be
insufficient to bridge state financing gaps from a moderate or severe
recession”); Michael Leachman and Jennifer Sullivan, “Some States Much
Better Prepared Than Others for Recession,” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities (Mar. 20, 2020); and Jared Walczak, “State Strategies for
Closing FY 2020 With a Balanced Budget,” Tax Foundation (Apr. 2, 2020).
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government does not operate under balanced
budget constraints. The next best source of funds
is to seek the cheapest possible sources of credit.
UI has long been proven to be one of the
government’s most effective fiscal tools against
5
recessions. During the current political climate, it
also offers states probably the cheapest source of
effective credit, and a nearly limitless one to boot.
Put another way, as of the time of writing, the
amount of federal aid to the states has been
6
plainly inadequate. The states can reform their UI
systems so as to generate substantial additional
federal support.
Unfortunately, to access this lifeline, states
will have to act aggressively to set aside longstanding resistance to truly effective UI programs
— that is, state governments must abandon (at
least temporarily) the many needless obstacles
that have accumulated over time that make it
difficult for individuals to claim UI in an
expedient and effective fashion. These barriers
have made it difficult not only for individuals to
file claims, but also costly and cumbersome for
states to process them. News stories abound
about states struggling with backlogs of cases that
may stretch for months at current processing
rates. That is intolerable.
To be clear, we think that most — if not all —
of these obstacles probably merit permanent
demolition, but we would not make this perfect
outcome the enemy of a good (and crucially
needed) outcome in the form of temporary
waivers. Thus, in this article, we will argue that
temporary waivers of many UI obstacles would be
an important and urgently needed contribution to
state budgets and to the national economy. As we
will explain, with some simple steps, states can
expand benefits, ease barriers to filing claims, and
wipe out long backlogs of individuals waiting for
their claims to be processed.
It may be useful for readers to first have a brief
overview of how the UI system works and is

7

financed. UI provides payments to qualifying
separated workers. States control, subject to some
minimum federally set floors, the rules for what
makes workers qualify to receive benefits; the
systems for verifying that workers meet those
qualifications; the fraction of wages that
qualifying workers receive; and the rules
governing how long benefits are provided.8 The
U.S. Department of Labor is authorized to
approve or reject state benefit changes if they are
inconsistent with federal law, but federal law
provides fairly wide latitude to states in these
9
areas.
State UI benefits are financed by a tax similar
to federal payroll taxes (that is, a tax imposed on
worker wages up to an annual limit, which varies
10
by state from $7,000 to about $52,000), paid by
11
employers. Taxes are “experience rated,” which
means that employers whose employees
successfully claim benefits are taxed at a higher
12
rate. Obviously, this encourages employers to
13
make claiming benefits hard for workers. The
federal government also imposes a small tax on
the first $7,000 of each worker’s wages, and uses
this money mostly to pay any emergency benefits
authorized by Congress and to establish a reserve
fund for states to access in crisis.
Since payments during recessions are usually
inadequate to meet demand, federal law strongly
encourages states to establish a trust fund
account, which serves as a kind of rainy day fund
for UI benefits. States that deplete their own
reserves can borrow against the federal fund,
which in turn can borrow against general federal
revenues. Federal law requires states to begin

7

Readers can find somewhat longer summaries in Congressional
Budget Office, “Unemployment Insurance in the Wake of the Recent
Recession,” CBO Pub. No. 4525 (Nov. 2012), and U.S. Department of
Labor, “Unemployment Compensation: Federal-State Partnership” (May
2019); and a much more extensive discussion in Brian Galle, “How to
Save Unemployment Insurance,” 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 1009 (2019).
8

See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits.

9

See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 3-6, 11; and 26 U.S.C. section
3304(a).
10

U.S. Department of Labor, Significant Features of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws Effective January 2020.
11

5

Walter Nicholson and Karen Needles, “Unemployment Insurance:
Strengthening the Relationship Between Theory and Policy,” 20 J. Econ.
Perspectives 47, 48 (2006).
6

Elizabeth McNichol et al., “States Need Significantly More Fiscal
Relief to Slow the Emerging Deep Recession,” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities (Apr. 14, 2020).
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Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania also collect some tax from
employees. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 8.
12

Id. at 10.
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Patricia M. Anderson and Bruce D. Meyer, “The Effects of Firm
Specific Taxes and Government Mandates With an Application to the
U.S. Unemployment Insurance Program,” 65 J. Pub. Econ. 119 (1997).
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repaying some of these loans relatively quickly —
by September 30 for loans taken out before May of
14
this year. Loans taken between May and
September will not be due until December 2021,
although interest will accrue in the interim.15
Federal law imposes substantial penalties if
16
balances are not eventually repaid. In the
aftermath of 2008, however, Congress suspended
17
interest payments for an additional two years.
Federal law now authorizes interest-free
borrowing for states that hit trust fund targets,18
and while about 60 percent of states were at that
target in February, the interest suspension lasts
only until October 1.19
This combination of rules creates both serious
dangers and major opportunities for states. The
dangers are largely dangers of stasis. The
combination of experience rating, political
economy, and poor program design has resulted
in significant pressure on states to minimize
20
benefits and make them difficult to claim.
Adding to these intentional obstacles, the
challenge of massive spikes in public need and
claim filings has resulted in performance that is,
21
predictably, four-letter-word inspiring. Further,
if states comply with their existing experiencerating laws, they will soon begin hiking taxes to
fill their empty trust funds, further delaying any
economic recovery.
But the present opportunities to improve UI
systems are great as well. More than 20 states
began 2020 with balances in their UI trust funds
that were too low to meet a standard measure of
adequate savings.22 The widespread fiscal pain
this entails suggests that there will almost

14

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 8.

15

Id.; see generally 20 CFR section 606.

16

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 8-9.

17

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009).
18

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 9-10.

19

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund
Solvency Report 2020; 20 CFR 606.32.
20

See Galle, supra note 7, at 1030-36.

21

See Gary Fineout and Marc Caputo, “‘It’s a Sh-- Sandwich’:
Republicans Rage as Florida Becomes a Nightmare for Trump,” Politico,
Apr. 3, 2020 (quoting Florida official describing Florida’s UI
administration as a “sh*t sandwich.”); see also Lawrence Mower, “Ron
DeSantis Was Warned About Florida’s Broken Unemployment Website
Last Year, Audit Shows,” Tampa Bay Times, Mar. 31, 2020.
22

U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 19.

certainly be, at minimum, a repeat of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
approach of suspending interest on state debts for
a substantial period, and there will likely be
considerable pressure to wipe out at least a
portion of state debts to the federal fund. We say
this both as a positive prediction of what we
expect from the federal government, and as a
normative statement of what the federal
government should do as part of making the UI
program function appropriately in this crisis.
States, in short, can reasonably expect to be
able to borrow at minimal interest to fund
essentially unlimited UI expenditures. Further,
since the state UI trust fund is not a balance sheet
item in most jurisdictions, this borrowing will not
affect legal balanced-budget obligations.
We should acknowledge that this
recommendation comes with fiscal risks.
Admittedly, not all bond rating agencies will
overlook state UI debts, but at current interest
rates, the marginal cost of a slightly lower rating
is modest compared with the budgetary and
human payoffs. After the Great Recession, states
scrambled to repay the federal government before
penalty provisions kicked in, including by cutting
benefits. Some states found that they could secure
lower interest rates through general obligation
23
bonds than by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury.
Our argument is that the nation has likely learned
enough from this experience not to repeat it. Even
if not, the choice between UI borrowing now,
when unemployment rates are in double digits,
and slightly higher taxes in several years seems to
us an easy choice.
For these reasons, state governments should
massively increase UI spending, beginning as
soon as possible, and then devote every effort to
qualifying as many beneficiaries as possible
rapidly. Under the recently enacted Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,
Congress provides an additional $600 per
qualifying worker per benefits period payment,
24
all fully federally funded. This offers massive
potential economic relief and potential stimulus
to local economies, with obvious knock-on effects

23
24

U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 19.
CARES Act section 2104.

TAX NOTES STATE, MAY 4, 2020
®
Electronic
copy
available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3619584
For more
Tax Notes
Stateat:
content,
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

637

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

for revenue sources such as state and local sales
taxes. Yet under current law in some states,
relatively few separated workers will receive any
benefits. For instance, in Southern and Mountain
states, fewer than one in five workers who lose
25
their jobs typically receive UI.
States should thus act immediately to remove
as many obstacles to claiming benefits as possible.
Ideally, states would ask employers to identify
every separated worker, and automatically enroll
those workers for UI benefits. If verification
procedures were deemed necessary, state agency
employees could follow up later, and separated
workers who are ultimately deemed ineligible
could be cut off from additional benefits. Now,
though, the burdens of inertia and bureaucratic
box-checking should rest entirely on the state. To
facilitate this process, states should suspend
experience rating,26 and perhaps even offer small
bounties to employers that identify workers who
successfully claim benefits.
States should also be creative in expanding
eligibility for benefits. Federal law, for instance,
already allows states to grant benefits for “short
time” or “work sharing” employees, whose
positions are not eliminated but whose hours are
27
reduced. Nevertheless, about 20 states do not use
this authority presently. The CARES Act
encourages short-time programs by paying 100
percent of the state’s 2020 benefit payments. Even
states whose laws don’t authorize short-term
benefits can get a 50 percent federal contribution
by entering into a temporary agreement with the
U.S. Department of Labor.28
Again, because federal law places no real caps
on state benefit generosity, states have the
flexibility to vastly expand benefits for part-time
workers, to lengthen benefits duration, to make
“replacement rates” (that is, the fraction of former
wages paid by UI) much higher, and to offer
transitional training and job search assistance.
Although the CARES Act provides a modest

29

benefit for gig and other nontraditional workers,
states could still take greater steps to provide a
lifeline to these workers.
A traditional worry about many of these
approaches, especially about long-term and
hassle-free benefits, is that they might discourage
workers from seeking new work. Recent social
science shows these fears are overblown.
Especially in recessions, when work is scarce,
workers are reluctant to turn down any work
30
opportunities. There is, in other words, little
moral hazard during recessions. States could
return to their old policies when the crisis is far in
our rearview mirrors, but for now, there is little
downside to dramatically increasing the ease and
generosity of UI programs.
When the coronavirus crisis is over, the
country will need to confront the poor program
design choices that made UI a shadow of what it
31
was made for. We hope to address some of these
steps in a later article. But even now, before such
reform, the system has enough flexibility that
states can abandon decades of bad policy and
transform UI into the crisis stopper it was
designed to be. States should take advantage of
this flexibility promptly to prevent unnecessary
harm.


29

CARES Act section 2102.

30

25

U.S. Department of Labor, Chartbook, Recipiency Rates by State

2019.
26

At least 16 states have already done this. National Employment
Law Project, “Policy Brief: Unemployment Insurance Protections in
Response to COVID-19: State Developments” (Mar. 27, 2020).
27

26 U.S.C. section 3306(v).

28

CARES Act sections 2108, 2109.
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Kory Kroft and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, “Should Unemployment
Insurance Vary With the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence,”
83 Rev. Econ. Stud. 1092, 1093 (2016); Jesse Rothstein, “Unemployment
Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, at 143, 181 (Fall 2011); Johannes F. Schmieder et al.,
“The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business
Cycle: Evidence From Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over 20
Years,” 127 Q.J. Econ. 701, 703, 746 (2012).
31

See Galle, supra note 7, at 1049-63 for proposals.
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